The general arrangement of the material in Hegel's Berlin note-books differs very little from that of the second edition of the 'Encyclopaedia'
and the third edition introduced no changes. In the: note-books, part of
the theory of colours is placed differently however, and attention has been
drawn to this in a note (II. 378). These note-books, and the lectures
delivered from them, were still based upon the first edition of the 'Encyclopaedia', where much of the material was arranged differently.
Hegel became aware of the shortcomings in the ordering of its material
soon after he had published .this book, but its arrangement approximates to that of his later work more than it does to that of the Jena notes, and
it is therefore an important link in the history of his development. The
main fault .in the first edition was that the higher relationships of a sphere
were regarded as the premises of the lower relationships. In mechanics for example, universal gravitation is said to give rise to pressure, fall, impact, and inertia. In physics, the individual physics of shape has the
more finite relationships of specific gravity, cohesion, sound, and heat
worked into it. Thus the mathematics of space and time constitute section
one of the whole; in section two, physics is subdivided into the triad of
absolute and .finite mechanics, elementary physics, and individual physics; and section three deals with organics. In the second edition however, for
the first time, the abstract moments of a whole such as shape are no longer
introduced in the sphere of their totality, but are allowed to precede in
logical progression as the stages of its becoming, though shape is also the
true prius of these stages (II. 92-93).
The Jena note-book still takes the basic division of objectivity in the
'Logic' as its point of departure, and the philosophy of nature is therefore
divided into mechanics, chemism, and life as teleology. Its mechanics
include space, time, place, motion, mass, and the celestial sphere. The
first sub-division of chemism is 'figuration', and presents light, inertia, fall, projection, pendulum, pressure, elasticity, impact, sound, cohesion,
magnetism, the crystal, and electricity. The second sub-division is 'The chemical process', which begins with heat, passes to the four physical and
the four chemical elements, then to the meteorological process, and
concludes with odour, taste, and colour as the particular characteristics of bodies, together with their particular existence as metal, sulphur and
salt. The third sub-division is 'The chemism of physically individual
bodies', and covers the actual chemical processes of fire and water, and
galvanism. In this note-book, the only essential change in the arrangement
of the 'Organics' occurs in the unique and somewhat clumsy ordering of the three universal organic processes (III. 41-44), the first two divisions of which cover the processes of nutrition and formation.
This note-book has many passages which bear the marks of Hegel's
struggle to complete the dissolution of empirical material into logical
thought, and in particular to maintain the strictness of the dialectical
transitions from one matter to another. I could draw attention to several
passages illustrating this, and despite the efforts I have made to round off
their phrases and clarify their thought, the reader will still be aware of the
laboured awkwardness with which their profundity was first expressed.
Other passages are still brightly coloured with the full poetry of the philosophy
of nature, and even its method of drawing ingenious parallels has
not completely disappeared. The pervasive thoughtfulness of mature Hegelianism already shines through this glitter however, for even at the
beginning of his career, Hegel's mastery in dialectic goes hand in hand
with the whole breadth of empirical knowledge, and it is this combination
which breaks forth into his weighty and illuminating thoughts. I did not want to suppress these passages, their style distinguishes them clearly
enough from the rest of the writing, and the reader will have no difficulty
in picking them out by the genuine poetry with which they touch the
true nature of the subject matter.
I should also like to draw attention to the fact that in this early notebook, Hegel began the philosophy of nature with ether. This principle has
recently found great favour with physicists, and if I now have to dampen
the enthusiasm with which they have accepted it, this is merely because I
do not wish to lay Hegel open to the censure of having regarded it in the
same way as they do. The words he uses when discussing it indicate a
philosophy of nature which is still closely related to the striving Fichtean
idealism which Schelling built into his first sketch of a systematic
philosophy of nature. Hegel begins in the following way: this is in fact
the first transition he made from the logical Idea to nature, 'As the determinate being which has gone back into its Notion, the Idea may now
be called absolute matter or ether. It is evident that this has the same significance as pure spirit, for this absolute matter is in no way sensuous, but is the
Notion as pure Notion in itself. As such this is existent spirit. It is called ether
in so far as spirit is not being thought of, the one name replacing the other for
the same reason. Ether in its simplicity and self-equality is therefore the
indeterminate soul of spirit; it is motionless quiescence or the essence which is perpetually returning into itself from otherness. It is the substance and being of all things, as well as the inftnite elasticity which has rejected and dissolved every form and determinateness within it, but which for that very reason constitutes the absolute pliability and potentiality of all form. Ether is therefore being, and
although it is not ubiquitous in its penetration, it constitutes everything. It has nothing external to it, and does not change, for it is the dissolution of everything,
the simple purity of negativity, the fluidity of undisturbable transparency. By
having returned into the self-equality of being, this pure essence has eradicated
and left behind difference as such, and has become opposed to it. Ether is therefore
the implicitness which has not displayed its becoming, in difference, as this
essence. It is merely the teeming matter which is in itself the absolute motion of
the fermentation which is certain of itself as the whole truth, and which remains
in itself and equal to itself in this free independence of the moments which have preserved the truth within it. In so far as it is said to be ether or absolute matter,
it is in itself, or pure self-consciousness, and is this as general being, not as determinate being nor as being of a determinately real nature. This determinateness
of non-determinate being passes over into determinate being however, and the
element of reality is the universal determinateness in which spirit has its being as nature. The inner essence or ether is not present there, and one might say that the inwardness of its being-in-self is not its truth; it is in precisely the same way that
the determination of implicit being expresses the essence of ether, which is opposed to form'.
This philosophic encyclopaedia of the natural sciences now awaits the judgement of philosophers and scientists. The considerable range of
empirical material it covers is not taken for granted, and is often presented
with a certain predilection. This is by no means out of place in academic
discourses of this kind however, for although the professionals are sufficiently
aware of the facts, Hegel was not always able to assume that this
basic knowledge was already present in the minds of his students, and as it
was indispensable for the understanding of his ideas, he was forced to
present it to them.
History is rich in the decrees of fate, and the appearance of this work together with the arrival of Schelling at Berlin, is certainly one of them. The man who planned the philosophy of nature, but was unable to do
more than lay its foundations, will fmd the building completed in this
work. In this book he may hail the genius of one who 'later became' his
friend, for he is the father of the science developed here, and he of all
men living is most to be honoured for it. Yet if he believes it to be his mission, 'to lead philosophy out of the undeniably difficult position in which it fmds itself at present', and to save if from, a 'terrible shipwreck,
and the destruction of all noble convictions', in order to, 'really break
through into the promised land of philosophy'; he will have to undertake
a scientific refutation of these legitimate children of his own philosophizing, for without this he cannot hope to return from his long exile, and to
grasp again the sceptre of philosophy. The 'page in the history of philosophy'
which be began to write forty years ago has been 'fmished' by
his followers, and it is some years now since it was turned, and its conclusions
drawn and generally acknowledged. The history of philosophy has not yet failed to fmd expression because Schelling has kept quiet. Philosophy is not without 'a free, untroubled, and completely unhindered
movement', merely because Schelling's 'inner nature' causes him to feel
constrained and embarrassed by the strictly scientific procedure of a
dialectical method. 'It is in this metropolis that the fate of German
philosophy will have to be decided,' but if Schelling merely repeats the
promises he has made for forty years; if the whole world is still said to
have misunderstood him, and his first philosophy merely to have contained
the injunction 'to avoid absence of thought', while his second philosophy
is attempting to draw all its positive content from beyond rationality;
then despite the most solemn assurances that this is not the case, he
will have shown that he has abandoned the true freedom of a scientific
philosophy, and will most certainly come to grief in the shadow of the
giant he is trying to overreach. In any case, we now await him here on this
field of battle, where many of the heroes of modern German philosophy
are still to be found. He is by no means 'a burden' to us, nor are we unable
to 'accommodate' him, for we welcome the opportunity of accounting for the necessity of his relapse into a philosophy of revelation, and we shall therefore give careful consideration to his reasons for having found it impossible to keep to the giddy height which formed the intellectual
intuition of his youth.
Berlin, Michelet.
December 10, 1841. |